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COPYRIGHT, JEWISH LAW AND CREATIVITY 
 
Not many people would link copyright with Jewish law, but this connection 
should not be surprising to those who know something about both areas. Jewish 
law, known as halakhah, is a legal system governing far more than Jewish 
religious behavior.  Its scope extends to just about every area of human existence 
such as personal relationships, property, inheritance, sex, clothing, ethics, health 
concerns, and business. According to Jewish tradition, the source of halakhah is 
Divine but human beings are charged with its implementation and development. 
As such, halakhah is very much an expression of human creativity. In the secular 
realm, the purpose of copyright law is to protect works of authorship that are 
products of human creativity.  When seen in this way, it is logical and fitting that 
Jewish law, itself a product of human creativity, has something to say about 
whether and how authors and their works should be protected. 
 
This reality was not lost on Microsoft.  In the 1990s, the company’s Israeli 
subsidiary sought not only secular legal relief against software piracy in Israeli 
courts, but also petitioned a rabbinic court in the ultra-Orthodox enclave of Bnei 
Brak for a ruling that would support its position as a matter of Jewish law. 
Microsoft received a favorable ruling in the form of an edict labeling as 
“transgressors” those who copy computer disks and various programs and sell 
them for a low price. The ruling also stated that people who purchase these 
unlawful copies are “abettors of those who violate the law.”  
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 Professor Neil Netanel’s new book, FROM MAIMONIDES TO MICROSOFT: 
THE JEWISH LAW OF COPYRIGHT SINCE THE BIRTH OF PRINT, opens 
with a discussion of the Microsoft ruling by the rabbinic court, a topic to which he 
returns in the final chapter. His book furnishes a meticulously researched and 
artfully presented account of the history of copyright law as it has developed 
under the watchful eyes of rabbinic authority.  A product of decades1 of research, 
percolation time, and masterful linguistic crafting, Netantel’s book appears to be 
written with two major goals in mind.  One goal is to tell the story of the 
development of the Jewish law of copyright as it has been formulated by rabbinic 
decisors since the sixteenth century.  I suspect this story is one that is largely 
unfamiliar to many students of halakhah, let alone scholars of copyright law 
generally. The second goal is the demonstration of how the halakhah of copyright 
law has been influenced by historical and cultural factors operating both within 
and outside of the Jewish community.  
 
Netanel writes in his preface that as originally conceived, this book was to be a 
more basic introduction to Jewish copyright law written for the purpose of 
providing a comparative perspective to students and practitioners of secular 
copyright law.  As his project proceeded, he realized that if he was to do this topic 
justice, he had to address broader issues that surfaced during his research such as 
the impact of “external, non-Jewish influences” on the law’s development; “the 
historical context in which early modern rabbis enunciated a Jewish law of 
copyright; and parallels between the Jewish law of copyright and its secular and 
papal counterparts”  (Preface, ix). In other words, Netanel realized that the story 
of Jewish copyright law is not just a story about the intrinsic application of 
halakhic jurisprudence.  It is also a story about how this body of halakhah 
emerged from the surrounding cultures and historical circumstances in which the 
Jews were living.  It is a story about how the legal environment of those cultures 
impacted the development of halakhah.   
 
Netanel’s book clearly illustrates the principle that law and culture are inevitably 
intertwined.  This is true not just for secular law but also for halakhah, which 
some regard as a completely insular legal system admitting of no outside 
influence.  The intersection between halakhah and culture has been the focus of 
my own work on Jewish law and tradition,2 and I was elated to see how Netanel 
took a specific aspect of Jewish tradition, one not related to ritual, and told a story 
with lessons for copyright, comparative, and Jewish law scholars.  
 
Early on, Netanel details the development of rabbinic bans on reprinting books 
beginning with the first known ban issued in Rome in 1518. He illustrates how 
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these bans simultaneously draw from, and yet differ, from the papal bans and 
secular book privileges in vogue at that time. Enforcement of these bans through a 
decree of excommunication was common with respect to both rabbinic and papal 
bans.  Other similarities with the secular book privileges suggest that they too 
served as a model for rabbinic decisors of the early modern era.  These 
homogenous elements “reflect the confluence of shared understandings among 
early modern Jews and Gentiles regarding the nature of authorship” (p. 51).  Yet, 
in fashioning these bans, the rabbis drew heavily from the intrinsic sources of the 
Jewish tradition such as the Torah, Talmud, and subsequent halakhah.  This focus 
on Jewish tradition is evident in the first rabbinic ban given its emphasis on 
halakhah’s prohibition of encroaching on someone else’s livelihood. The focus of 
the book privileges, in contrast, was on the sovereign’s discretion to reward 
deserving subjects.  
 
This concept of borrowing elements from the surrounding culture and transposing 
these elements to suit both halakhah’s unique framework and the diverse customs 
of Jews living in distinct communities has been a hallmark of Jewish law 
throughout the centuries.  As Professor Joel Roth has observed, “borrowings from 
other legal systems, whether consciously or unconsciously…often incorporate the 
sociological reality into the Jewish legal system, sometimes intact and sometimes 
modified.”3  Netanel illustrates how the first reprinting ban captures the essence 
of this process to the extent the rabbis  “took venerable Talmudic injunctions 
against encroaching on another’s livelihood and applied them to the new business 
of printing and selling books, a business that the technology of the printing press 
made at once possible and vulnerable to ruinous competition” (p. 64).  In doing 
so, the rabbis boldly transcended existing Jewish law (p. 64). 
 
Although the rabbis who issued the first ban drew from Jewish legal authority in 
supporting their conclusion, they did not develop extensive argumentation for 
their halakhic conclusion.  Netanel devotes a chapter to the subsequent halakhic 
arguments by Moses Isserles, who later became the leading Ashekanic Jewish 
authority of his generation.  In 1550, Isserles issued his very first responsum 
(legal opinion), resolving a dispute between two competing editions of the Misheh 
Torah, a well-known code of Jewish law written by the celebrated medieval 
philosopher Moses Maimonides.  The circumstances prompting this dispute 
required Isserles to delve into complex jurisdictional and other matters that the 
rabbis in Rome were able to avoid.  Ultimately, Isserles issued a reprinting ban 
and order of excommunication, limited in scope to Poland, for those who bought 
or possessed an illicit edition of the work. Significantly, his reasoning focused on 
the harm engendered by predatory pricing rather than a concern for the copying of 
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subject matter that would be considered copyrightable material today (p. 99-100).  
For this reason, Netanel concludes that his ruling “does not sound in ‘copyright,’ 
as that term would be understood in present-day secular law” (p. 100). 
 
Despite the limitations of the ruling issued by Isserles, it became the basis for the 
subsequent widespread adoption of rabbinic book bans.  In the next chapter, 
Netanel traces the role of these bans in the development of the Hebrew book trade 
beginning in the late sixteenth century, and compares the operation of these bans 
with secular book privileges.  In early modern Europe, Jewish communities 
enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy, with lay authorities often maintaining 
a position of power superior to that of  the rabbinate. With respect to the book 
trade, however, rabbinic authority still prevailed, as lay councils typically 
required rabbinic approval for printing and also honored rabbinic impositions of 
excommunication (p. 121).  This chapter also illustrates the importance of cross-
cultural influences in the developing halakhah concerning reprinting bans and the 
culture of regulation in the Jewish communities.  Netanel notes that the book 
regulations governing the Jewish communities paralleled the regulations in force 
for non-Jewish communities but also “reflected the particularities of Jewish 
communal life, the rabbinic tradition, and the Hebrew book trade” (p. 122).    
 
During this period, we see the emergence of a nuanced, but often contradictory, 
halakhah concerning reprinting bans.  As discussed, the earlier bans focused on 
the venerable halakhic prohibition against encroaching on someone else’s 
livelihood.  In contrast, later multi-faceted rulings, both supporting and opposing 
these bans, were bolstered by a wide range of halakhic doctrine and underlying 
policy. Netanel devotes two chapters to these significant controversies, including 
a discussion of two important disputes in the early nineteenth century that laid the 
foundations for subsequent applications of Jewish copyright law.   
 
The first of these chapter details the cross-border dispute over a set of holiday 
prayer books known as Sefer Krovot Hu Mahzor.  This dispute involved two 
major jurists, Mordekhai Banet and Moses Sofer, who engaged in an extended 
colloquy about the theory and parameters of Jewish copyright law.  Both rabbis 
invoked policy and current social realities to justify their contrasting views on 
whether reprinting bans can be justified halakhically.  Banet’s legal conclusions 
reflect his overarching policy perspective that reprinting bans are anti-
competitive, especially when they are applied to geographical areas outside of the 
territory in which they are originally issued, or for a duration exceeding the time 
in which the petitioning publisher has recouped his investment.  In contrast, Sofer 
sees reprinting bans in a favorable light.  He believes they are supported not only 
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halakhah’s concern for preventing wrongful competition, but also by the policy of 
promoting the publication of Jewish books in all potential markets of the 
publisher.  
 
The second chapter continues to explore the growing body of Jewish copyright 
law by focusing on a major dispute involving competing editions of the Talmud. 
This dispute resulted in several rabbinic responses, including one from Sofer, and 
Netanel analyzes each of them meticulously.  This diversity of views as to both 
the legality and appropriate scope of rabbinic printing bans foreshadows Netanel’s 
analysis of the range of opinions on the scope of contemporary Jewish copyright 
law that he addresses in his final chapter. 
 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, rabbinic reprinting bans waned in 
importance, a development that paralleled the disintegration of Jewish communal 
autonomy and rabbinic juridical authority. Jewish copyright law was shaped in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century by the differing opinions of Joseph Saul 
Nathanson and Yitzhak Schmelkes. Nathanson’s approach was groundbreaking to 
the extent he posited that authors maintain a perpetual, exclusive right to reprint 
their creative works.  In his view, authors enjoy a property right that is completely 
divorced from rights deriving from the rabbinic reprinting bans or the Jewish law 
of wrongful competition. Netanel explains Nathanson’s ruling as not grounded in 
Talmudic logic or precedent but rather as a reflection of the need for Jewish law 
to take into account the legal norms of secular jurisprudence with respect to the 
rights of authors (p. 222).  In contrast to Nathanson’s direct incorporation of 
secularist copyright notions into Jewish law, Schmelkes essentially concluded that 
secular law governs these matters according to the halakhic doctrine of dina de-
malkhuta dina (the law of the land is the law).  
 
Netanal’s final chapter is titled “The Present-Day Debate: Is Copyright 
Infringement ‘Stealing’?.”  It demonstrates that although neither Nathanson’s nor 
Schmelkes’s rulings carry the day presently, their earlier opinions played a part in 
shaping what he sees as the two modern competing perspectives on Jewish 
copyright law. One perspective understands copyright as property.  The other 
perspective, which garners more support today, sees copyright as an “amalgam” 
of rights arising from a multitude of sources including early rabbinic bans, 
binding custom, protection against wrongful competition and unjust enrichment, 
and deference to secular law regarding commercial matters.  Netanel’s analysis 
also demonstrates how secular copyright law has influenced both modern schools 
of thought. 
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The last chapter also returns to the significance of Microsoft’s role in the narrative 
of Jewish copyright law. From a copyright perspective, Netanel discusses why the 
rabbinic edict answers raises more questions than it answers. From a socio-
cultural perspective, Netanel stresses the irony of Microsoft seeking a ruling from 
a rabbinic court of one of Israel’s most Orthodox and insular communities in 
which all secular entertainment, as well as the Internet, is condemned and banned. 
He observes that in reality, both the Microsoft ruling, and other rabbinic 
pronouncements “have failed to stem the tide of Internet usage” in Israel’s ultra-
Orthodox communities (p. 238).   
  
Throughout his book, Netanel’s focus is on how copyright law safeguards the 
economic interests of authors and publishers.  As he acknowledges in his 
Introduction, however, copyright laws in most countries also incorporate 
protections for the personal interests of authors through moral rights laws.  
Netanel explains that moral rights law recognizes the “rights to claim authorship 
credit and to prevent distortions in the author’s work even after the author has 
transferred to a publisher or studio her exclusive rights of copying, distribution, 
adaptation, and public communication” (p. 5). 
 
Moral rights violations often arise in circumstances in which someone other than 
the author has the ability to publish or reproduce a copyrighted work.  For 
example, in many countries a moral rights claim could arise if the publisher of a 
Jewish book removes a haskama, a rabbinic approbation for a particular book, 
without the author’s permission. The basis for this claim would be that authors 
seek these approbations based on their judgments about the stature and credibility 
of these rabbinic authorities, and their unauthorized removal violates the integrity 
and vision of the author’s work.  This type of claim would not be viable in the 
United States, however, because here visual artists are the only authors protected 
by moral rights under federal copyright law.4 
 
Although Netanel addresses the historical connection between rabbinic 
approbations and reprinting bans, he does not discuss the removal issue generally 
or specifically in the context of moral rights.5 Given that his work concentrates on 
how the Jewish tradition protects the economics aspects of works of authorship, 
he should not be faulted for this omission. Still, the Jewish tradition’s perspective 
on these personal interests furnishes a relevant backdrop to Netanel’s narrative.   
 
The story of moral rights and the Jewish tradition begins with the narrative of 
Adam and Eve in Genesis, the first book of the Torah.  In chapter 2, verse 17, 
God commands Adam not to eat from the Tree of Knowledge. This verse says 
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nothing about refraining from touching the fruit. In chapter 3, verse 3, Eve tells 
the serpent that God’s instructions were neither to eat nor touch the fruit, or else 
they would die.  
 
According to the tradition of the Oral Law that rabbinic authorities invoke to 
understand Biblical text, Adam wanted to add a safeguard to God’s 
commandment of not touching the fruit, so he told Eve not to eat or touch it. 
Adam did not, however, tell Eve that this addition was his own innovation.  The 
cunning serpent then shoved Eve against the fruit, and showed her that she would 
not die from touching the fruit. As a result, the serpent was able to convince Eve 
that she could also eat the fruit without any negative consequences.6   Based on 
this interpretation of the Biblical text, Adam’s lack of regard for God’s moral 
rights in His instructions caused the expulsion of the couple from Eden. 
 
All relevant works of Jewish law on this topic cite as the direct legal source a 
statement from the Ethics of the Fathers, a Talmudic tractate embodying the 
accumulated ethical and moral wisdom of the rabbinic sages. The importance of 
having one’s words properly attributed to the original source is emphasized here 
in the following verse: “Whoever repeats a thing in the name of the one who said 
it brings redemption to the world.”7  The commentary by Rabbi Meir Zlotowitz 
emphasizes that a person “must display indebtedness to a source and mention him 
by name,”8 thus prohibiting taking false credit for a statement made by someone 
else.  Implicitly, this verse also mandates a responsibility for accurate quotation. 
 
Based on the Ethics of the Fathers, it is clear that the Jewish tradition concerning 
authors’ personal interests is centered on the duty of the second speaker rather 
than on a right of the first speaker. In this way, the Jewish perspective on moral 
rights differs from the secular version that understands the law as a right of the 
author.  Moreover, a duty is perpetual but a right only lasts as long as the first 
speaker or her representative has the ability to enforce it. This suggests that 
according to the Jewish tradition, those who use an author’s work have a 
perpetual duty to safeguard the author’s moral rights interests. This view contrasts 
with most secular moral rights laws that provide the author with a period of 
protection lasting for as long as the copyright is in force.9  To illustrate this point 
in the context of removing haskamot, it seems as though Jewish tradition would 
say that this conduct arguably constitutes a violation of the second speaker’s duty 
to preserve the moral rights interests of the author.  
 
Also worthy of note is the Talmud’s focus on attribution through several 
generations of students and teachers.  When the Talmud states “Rabbi X said,” it 
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is conventional wisdom that the Talmud does not necessarily mean Rabbi X 
himself but rather the school of Rabbi X. The idea of misattribution in the Talmud 
must be accessed within its tradition of flexible, collective authorship.  Jewish 
Studies scholar Sacha Stern has observed that “only deceptive plagiarism would 
have constituted a breach of the practice of attribution.”10  Although authorship of 
material in the Talmud cannot be equated to authorship in Western terms, the 
concern for accurate attribution in the Jewish tradition, as well as preservation of 
artistic integrity, is palpable. 
 
For copyright, comparative law, and Jewish law readers, Professor Netanel’s book 
contains material that will fascinate and delight.  Those interested in Jewish law, 
on both theoretical and practical levels, will be intrigued with his nuanced 
halakhic discourse and perhaps even surprised by its application to copyright law.  
Copyright and comparative law scholars are likely to be interested in how he 
situates his halakhic discussions within a historical, sociological, and comparative 
law context, and deftly illustrates how rabbinic rulings are sensitive to “context” 
in copyright matters. Secular legal readers will also appreciate his deep discussion 
of whether copyright is, and should be considered, “property” under Jewish law, 
as well as his analysis of the implications of this characterization. 
 
END NOTES 
                                                 
1 Netanel acknowledges in his Preface that early on, he and David Nimmer were 
going to co-author the book. Although Nimmer was unable to continue in this 
capacity, Netanel provides touching credit to his former collaborator and indicates 
which portions of the book specifically were based upon his early drafts. 
2 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall,  THE MYTH OF THE CULTURAL JEW (Oxford 
University Press, 2015). 
3 Joel Roth, THE HALAKHIC PROCESS 303, (JTS Press, 1986). 
4  See 17 U.S.C. § 106A. 
5  For a discussion of the removal issue absent a connection to moral rights, see 
Marc B. Shapiro, CHANGING THE IMMUTABLE: HOW ORTHODOX 
JUDAISM REWRITES ITS HISTORY 152 (Littman Library of Jewish 
Civilization, 2015). 
6 Moshe Weissman, THE MIDRASH SAYS 45-46 (Bnay Yakov Publications, 
1980). 
7 PIRKEI AVOS, ETHICS OF THE FATHERS, Ch. 6, § 6, 59 (Mesorah 
Publications, 1984). 
8 Id. at 59 n. 6 (commentary by Rabbi Meir Zlotowitz). 
9 In some countries such as France, moral rights protection is perpetual. Many 
nations follow the minimum standard mentioned in the Berne Convention and 
terminate moral rights with copyrights. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, THE SOUL 
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OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED 
STATES 46 (Stanford University Press, 2010). 
10 See generally Sacha Stern, ATTRIBUTION AND AUTHORSHIP IN THE 
BABYLONIAN TALMUD, 45 JOURNAL OF JEWISH STUDIES 28 (1994). 
 
© 2016 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall 
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THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL 
PROPERTY: A COMMENTARY, by Sam Ricketson, Oxford University 
Press, 2015. 992 pp. Hardcover $450.00 
Reviewed by Jose Bellido 
University of Kent 
j.a.bellido@kent.ac.uk  
 
Introduction  
The appearance of Sam Ricketson’s ground-breaking study of the Berne 
Convention for the protection of literary and artistic works (1886)1 over three 
decades ago was welcomed as “a feat of scholarship.”2 The timely publication 
coincided with the centenary of the treaty. Both reviewers and commentators were 
surprised by the “careful attention to the sources”3 and the erudite, informative 
and “splendid”4 execution of a work that was rapidly praised as “seminal”.5 
Ricketson’s writings on Berne and other related topics made him one of the 
leading scholars of the discipline that has become to be known as “intellectual 
property”.6 In what was being increasingly recognised as a fully-fledged 
autonomous academic subject,7 the book constituted a magnificent bibliographic 
achievement, an exemplary work. Described by Cornish as a “work of very 
considerable scholarship” ;8 Ricketson’s work influenced and continues to 
influence those who write about the history of copyright, to the extent that his 
commentary of the Berne Convention was surely one of those books that shaped 
their becoming as academics.9 When I heard that Rickets on was in Cambridge 
preparing a new monograph, my first reaction was a feeling of enthusiasm that 
took me back to twenty years ago and made me to reflect on precisely that first 
experience of reading Ricketson’s earlier book. Memories of many delightful 
hours reading it surreptitiously as a junior lawyer doing extra hours in a lawyer’s 
office in Madrid came to my mind. Every page of this monumental and 
fascinating book contained a number of interesting twists. Certainly, it was one of 
those universal books destined to become a key point of reference in a particular 
field, an indispensable volume that could impress any reader. Three decades 
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later, Ricketson has developed the same detailed and ambitious analysis but has 
turned attention to a different subject, another major convention for intellectual 
property: The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883). 
Although any appraisal is arguably affected by how overwhelming the volume 
might be for the contemporary reader, there can be no doubt that this endeavour 
represents an enormous step forward in intellectual property scholarship. This 
breakthrough of sorts possesses incalculable value for future generations of 
scholars. This is already a singular and astonishing achievement as publications in 
the field, often focused on the immediate legal and doctrinal developments, have 
tended to convey solely “news” or expectations of future legislative horizons.10  
Taking into account that the Paris Convention is ubiquitously and routinely cited 
as a foundational text,11 it is surprising to note that few books on its history had 
been published in English before Ricketson’s commentary.12 As it turns out, there 
were just two or three publications covering the Convention in detail: a volume 
published to coincide with the centenary,13 an authoritative exegesis written by 
Georg Bodenhausen14 and two remarkable accounts given by Stephen Ladas.15 
Nevertheless, a brief glance at current intellectual property scholarship shows 
how the mention of Paris frequently appears in references to the Berne 
Convention (1886) and in the wider context of the so-called “internationalisation” 
of intellectual property. This is appropriate since, according to historians such as 
Adrian Johns, Paris and Berne “would set in train the international harmonization 
of intellectual property.”16 Rather than internationalisation, it might more accurate 
to describe this shift as “positivisation” of international intellectual property. As 
those levels were being defined (and redefined) by their histories, Ricketson’s 
nuanced gloss provides different lenses through which to view the shifting 
character of the Convention.  It is not just that chronological links or similar 
professional and institutional networks were built around them, but that Paris and 
Berne conventions share a number of properties and were routinely described as 
historical pillars of the international intellectual property edifice.17 Ricketson is 
more cautious in his approach and is keen to emphasise the differences and gaps 
between Berne and Paris (p. 279; 787). However, if there was ever an obvious 
candidate to explore the historical intricacies of the Paris Convention, it is 
Ricketson, whose skilful sense of craftsmanship and focused disciplinary ethos 
permeate his whole writing. He is systematic not only in his treatment and 
arrangement of the topic, but also in his reflections on his previous work, either 
personal or professional. Even the Acknowledgments are “systematized.” His 
style of answering questions and developing perspectives shows a particular and 
interesting tendency to break down any topic and organise it into different 
“levels” (at xlix; lxi). This distinctive care and passion for the object of scrutiny is 
a salient characteristic that arguably made him the most suitable writer to take on 
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what was previously perceived to be an impossible task. While the Berne 
Convention arguably lent itself to a systematic and clear analysis, the Paris 
Convention presented many obstacles that hampered its presentation as a 
“coherent and logical system, complete in itself” (p. 119). Many factors 
contributed to this perception, such as the proliferation of associated and special 
agreements that extended or refined what Ricketson interestingly defines as the 
Paris “system” (p. li). Moreover, the lack of minimum standards contributed to 
the difficulty of weaving a historical narrative after the Convention. Despite (or 
precisely because) the division of intellectual property into different domains was 
reinforced by the passage of the conventions,18 historians found it easier to write a 
history of international copyright after Berne than a history of a convention such 
as Paris that grouped patents, designs and trademarks together.19  
It is evident that the Paris Convention left puzzling interpretative questions not 
only about the different ways of conceptualising its respective subject matter but 
also about its institutional underpinnings.20 Such a history was clearly affected by 
a period of “stagnation and crisis” in the 1960s.21 Retrospectively, it is possible 
that the universality approach in Paris suffered much more than the one emerging 
from Berne.22 While the Berlin Revision Conference of the Berne Convention 
abolished copyright formalities,23 the Paris Convention continued to be hampered 
by formalities. This remarkable difference not only reinforced the territorial 
nature of rights but also, and more significantly, made the task of writing about 
them more difficult. Ricketson’s way of writing certainly helps to overcome some 
of these obstacles, elevating Paris to a paradigmatic case for the study of the 
development of industrial property in the twentieth-century. Certainly there are 
other ingredients that facilitated the book’s systematic approach, for instance, the 
numbering of paragraphs, the appearance of diagrams (p. 120) and the way that 
Ricketson builds on previous attempts to narrate the history of the Convention.24 
However, the book’s fluidity is provided by Ricketson’s sensitive approach to the 
Convention at different levels: overreaching issues (pp. 121-360); organizing 
principles (pp. 328-360) and subject matter protected (pp. 361-751).  
 
1. Time & Change 
It is, therefore, the multi-layered approach that best defines Ricketson’s book. 
Divided into five parts, the commentary presents a conceptual account of the 
history of the Paris Convention. The first section, potentially the most 
controversial of the book, is devoted to the Convention’s origins. Although an 
obvious start point for the historical narrative might be a disentangling of the 
“origins” of the Convention from the “mess” of previous bilateral agreements, the 
question arises as to whether or not such evolutionary story that charts the path 
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from national industrial property laws to international agreements was actually a 
history of origins and inevitable paths already mediated by the desire to enrol new 
members to the Union that the Convention established.25 In this sense, it is not a 
coincidence that the context of justification is almost simultaneously raised and 
linked to the author’s historical chronicling (pp. 6-24). When the book begins to 
narrate the antecedents to the Convention (pp. 25-61), one wonders whether such 
an absolute, ingenious and narrative synthesis is able to capture the imprecise and 
contingent ways in which the making of international conventions and its 
revisions actually materialised. In fact, institutional pressures, material 
infrastructures and interpersonal dynamics affected not only the arrangement of 
the treaty, but, more importantly, the way that its history was written.26 In other 
words, the collective emerging through the publishing endeavours of the Union 
created at Paris heavily invested in knowledge practices such as statistics and 
history in order to legitimise its own existence.27 The distinct ways in which these 
practices impinged upon and constituted the narration of a particular history of 
international intellectual property merits research. Rather than considering the 
Convention per se as a major problematic civilising gesture,28 the relationship 
between the text of the convention and its annotation is perhaps the major 
political issue inextricably connected to its history.29  Indeed, one of the main 
aims of these publications was to generate political trust and transparency in 
relation to the inner workings of the Union.30 In other words, the Convention was 
being largely sustained by these knowledge practices. This is particularly 
remarkable because many diplomatic acts connected to the Convention and its 
revision conferences depended on secrecy.31 
The Paris Convention was initially signed in 1883 by eleven countries: Belgium, 
Brazil, France, Guatemala, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, El Salvador, Serbia, 
Spain and Switzerland.32  However, it might be more interesting to turn attention 
to those who declined forming part of the initial fraternal circle or those who 
severed their links with the Convention.33 Such a detour enables us to avoid the 
epic celebratory statements on the birth of the Convention that characterised 
previous accounts and illustrates how particular countries had specific concerns 
regarding its effects. While this is not the place to map all of their diplomatic 
moves and responses, it would be interesting to briefly illustrate the multiplicity 
of histories that sprung from the prospect and the signing of a multilateral treaty.34 
For obvious reasons, connected to the cosmopolitan aspirations embedded in the 
Convention, their effect in colonial and postcolonial settings was notable.35 In 
November 1883, Chilean representatives considered that signing was not the 
right action to take at that point.36 Rather surprisingly, the source of contestation 
was not the fact that Chile was failing to protect “foreign” industrial property, but 
just the opposite: that domestic Chilean laws were more generous to foreigners 
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than the consequences of adhering to the principle of “national treatment” that 
was established in Paris.37 Similarly, Argentina found that although there could be 
benefits in joining the Convention, the “priority” right established at Paris 
preventing the country from signing.38 Other South American countries such as 
Uruguay waited to see who else would join, before deciding. Rather interestingly, 
Uruguay’s predictions were not completely accurate since countries they thought 
would sign, like Colombia, did not end up entering the multilateral treaty in 
1883.39 Here it is worth noting that the history of the Paris Convention is also the 
history of alternative attempts to develop a system of industrial property such as 
the Pan-American Conventions, since some of these emerged in response to 
Paris.40 Understanding and unpacking the challenges posed by the relationships of 
these different regimes is a task left to future historians.  
Another notable example of the international relations deployed is illustrated by  
attempts to sign the Convention by countries that had not participated in the 
Conferences. For instance, Serbia requested accession to the Revision Conference 
that took place in Madrid without having attended the original event, something 
that caused considerable furore in the Spanish headquarters.41 As it is well known, 
Great Britain joined the Paris Convention when it came into force in 
July 1884.42 Interestingly, one of the issues for the British Board of Trade was its 
increasing concern with German trade, thus it invested a considerable amount of 
diplomatic effort to persuade Germany to enter the Convention.43 In exploring 
these examples,  Ricketson’s book provides a framework to study the complex 
network of relationships shaped by the establishment of the Paris Convention. As 
was the case with Ricketson’s book on the Berne Convention, it is only a matter 
of time before this historical turn is taken up by future scholars interested in 
investigating the emergence of national histories connected to this major 
international event.44  
 
2. Paris and its Progeny 
The multiple iterations of the Paris Convention meant that tracing its trajectory is 
a difficult task. The Convention was subsequently revised in Madrid just three 
years later in 1886 (pp. 66-72);45 Rome in 1890 (pp. 72-74); Brussels in 1897 and 
1900 (pp. 75-77), Washington in 1911 (78-80); The Hague in 1925 (80-82); 
London in 1934 (pp. 83-85); Lisbon in 1958 (pp. 86-92) and Stockholm in 1967 
(93-96).46 When one looks at the number of revisions affecting the text initially 
agreed on in 1883 and compares them to the revisions of the Berne Convention, 
which are more limited and constrained, one can see how the convention agreed at 
Paris had become more and more complex, less manageable and uneven (p. 61). 
In exploring the work of the revision conferences, Ricketson patiently traces 
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changes of mood, different international approaches to important issues such as 
the mechanics of accession, uniform classifications (p. 71) and remarkable 
professional events such as the formation of the International Association for the 
Protection of Industrial Property (AIPPI; pp. 75-76).47 Although this constant 
process of revision is already an interesting historical process, the changes 
identified by Ricketson also reveal that some of the controversies related to the 
development of industrial property throughout the twentieth-century had already 
been identified in these conferences. As such, what made the Paris Convention 
even more interesting was not just the Convention itself, but its revisions and, 
more importantly, the series of agreements resulting from it.48 In order to survey 
this trajectory of texts and cross-references, Ricketson uses an interesting 
metaphor that refers to this series: “Paris and its progeny” (p. 119).  As he aptly 
describes, the Convention remained a “work in progress” (pp. 65-96), an 
incomplete project, or to a certain extent, a “caravan” (p. 106). Although the last 
revision – Ricketson notes- might be a sad story, “a tale of blunted aspirations on 
the parts of different – and now entrenched –regional groupings” (p. 105), the 
fruits of the Paris system can be seen in its interaction with and influence on some 
of the agreements that proliferated from it (pp. 106-120). One of them was the 
“Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False and Deceptive Indications of 
Source on Goods” in 1891 (p. 530). While the treaty failed to achieve the support 
of significant trading nations such as Germany, Italy and United States,49 it was 
nevertheless remarkable in elucidating and anticipating problems arising from the 
interpretation of Article 10 of the Paris Convention.50 Unlike the Paris 
Convention, a treaty covering a range of different categories of industrial 
property, the Madrid Agreement precipitated specific questions underpinning the 
tension between the protection of manufacturers and the protection of 
consumers.51 Over time, some difficulties raised in the late nineteenth-century 
were domesticated in the twentieth century. The reform of the Madrid Agreement 
in the Madrid Protocol (1989) is an example of successful international law 
reform (p. 109). In a parallel but connected development, Ricketson follows the 
fragmentation of international industrial property by looking at procedural and 
substantial treaties that emerged after Paris (pp. 109-113) and elucidates their 
links to the main Convention (p. 120). While some of the associated agreements 
can be explained by reference to a specific momentum, their culmination might be 
better described as an example of patient perseverance. In fact, the ongoing and 
repeated process of revision undoubtedly contributed and encouraged many 
countries to become members of the Union.   
The third part of Ricketson’s commentary moves from history to theory of 
international law (pp. 123-165). It does so in order to discuss the structure of the 
Convention and its interpretation. Ironically the chapter begins with a paragraph 
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from Lewis Carroll and juxtaposes it with a quote from the International Law 
Commission, commenting on its proposed principles of interpretation of the 
Vienna Convention (p. 123). It is not a surprise that, after highlighting the 
proliferation of treaties that emerged after Paris, the book turns to questions of 
public international law. Above all, the methodological shift serves to give 
coherence to the Paris Convention. Here Ricketson explains the difference 
between Paris and Berne and previous conventions dealing with posts and 
telecommunications (p. 125). He notes how Paris and Berne “both depend 
essentially upon implementation by each contracting state for the fulfilment of 
their purposes” (p. 125). In fact, some of the founding members such as Spain 
were intensely criticised for not having implemented the Convention almost a 
decade after its ratification.52 Ricketson surveys techniques employed in treaty 
interpretation (pp. 139-165) in addition to tackling the preliminary question of the 
official language of the Convention; how it was challenged and how languages in 
associated agreements were treated differently (p. 137). In doing so, the book 
momentarily and eloquently grasps the changes in the underlying linguistic 
history of the Convention (p. 132-133). Bureaucratically structured, the specific 
form of organisation constituted in the wake of the Paris Convention (“a Union 
for the protection of industrial property”) is also fully analysed in the book (pp. 
166-327). Ricketson points to new theoretical directions when he compares the 
functions of the Paris Bureau with the Bureau of International Telegraph Union 
(p. 169-180). Again, analysis of the legal personality and the “new kind of 
international entity [that] had come into existence” (p. 168) enables the reader to 
appreciate the distinctiveness and limitations of the Convention as well as 
enhancing the coherent narrative undertaken in the book.  In a rather skilful 
gesture, Ricketson traces the different meanings attributed to the notion of 
“union” in order to show how some accounts have tended to gloss over the issue 
rather “quickly” (p. 173). Although today’s discussion might be increasingly 
irrelevant, it does reveal a historical sensibility that moves between the past and 
the present smoothly, trying to emphasise the rise of distinct interpretations in 
their original contexts. Interestingly, Ricketson also covers the phrase 
“contracting countries” and does not allow the semantics to obscure the historical 
settings in which the meaning of the term had to be reassessed, mainly after 
World War II (p. 179).  
 
3. Industrial Property 
The explicit reference to the term “industrial property” in its title is another 
notable feature of the Paris Convention. While the term was not defined under the 
Paris Convention until the adoption of Article 1, first paragraph of the Hague Act 
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1925 (p. 184-185; p. 477), the expression acquired a particularly broad meaning.53 
Yet, it would be fascinating to consider the fate of the term in the twentieth-
century.54 Whereas some countries enacted laws giving a unified legislative 
framework to the term,55 others continued to legislate patents, trademarks and 
designs separately.56 Somewhat paradoxically, the Paris system found a variety of 
semantic resources to accommodate different meanings of its inner workings, but 
did not ultimately succeed in making the notion of “industrial property” 
completely viable as an international legal category.57 The failure of the term 
came precisely in its shift from a mere positivistic reference to an epistemic 
structure. For many different reasons, the notion lost its power to mobilise 
contemporary scholars and legislators and succumbed to the term of “intellectual 
property.” A myriad of factors contributed to its demise, but surely the notion of 
industry was already too vague and too elusive a term, particularly in relation to a 
subject matter that was left primarily undefined or even outlined in Paris (p. 758). 
Although it makes sense to talk about industrialized nations, as Ricketson does, 
one interesting avenue for research would be to explore how the contours of the 
term “industry” shifted in the twentieth century. It is important not to neglect the 
international attempts to regulate and define “scientific property” that emerged 
after Paris from the history of “industrial property”58 In fact, the shift from the 
factory to the laboratory might be vital to understanding the ways in which the 
project of defining “industrial property” also left many disparate areas such as 
enforcement and exploitation unresolved (p. 759). The point here is that patent or 
trademark laws were underpinned by tensions that were generated by different 
understandings of the term “industry” and the way in which the two poles of 
distribution and production developed in unpredictable and contentious ways 
during the twentieth-century. Curiously, a considerable number of emerging 
practices triggered by failures and deficiencies of the Paris system were 
characterised by a tendency towards “verbification” of intellectual property (e.g. 
merchandising, licensing, valuing, watching and searching). These activities 
operated at the level of an incipient legal practice where diplomatic consensus had 
supposedly failed. Attempts to trace some of their histories might reveal 
unexpected surprises, allegiances and exchanges, like those forged by some of the 
commentators of the Convention. One of these was Stephen P. Ladas who 
developed legal practices and services that tried to overcome theoretical failures 
“in house”.59  
The last two parts of Ricketson’s book are also remarkable. Part IV of the book is 
devoted to the specific subject matter protected by the Paris system. Again, 
Ricketson’s analysis skilfully pivots between the Paris Act 1883 and other 
conferences and revisions (p. 371-373). It charts histories of uneasy compromises 
(p. 393); governing principles (p. 380-381) and links several current articles to 
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their moment of introduction (p. 390) or even earlier (p. 416). The subject matter 
approach provides a microcosm of ways in which national treatment and the right 
of priority operated in respect to each category. It also shows that, whilst the 
Convention might not offer clear solutions to some contemporary questions, it 
could be used as a starting point to think about them (p. 551). Part V closes the 
book by situating the Paris Convention in the wider context of debates generated 
after the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement. 
Ricketson uses what he considers a “rather crude analogy” (p. 759) as a vehicle to 
describe the role of the Convention today. He suggests that the positon of the 
Paris Convention is “rather like that of the elderly family relative who is always 
present at family functions, but who is hard to place among the guests because his 
or her conversation is seen to be somewhat tedious and repetitive, even outdated. 
Nonetheless, all family members know in a general sense that he or she has had 
an important role to play in family affairs in the past, and this is, of course, the 
very reason for his or her inclusion in present family functions” (p. 759). More 
than background, the “family” metaphor is at once conclusive (p. 792) and 
problematic because, as we all know, relatives are always a surprise.  
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